Abstract
Excerpt: Goetz ties moral freedom to an ontology of agency: “As a mind, I both act and passively experience things happening to me. … The distinction between being a mental agent and being a mental patient is grounded in the existence of two types of mental properties, namely, powers and capacities” (8). Goetz uses this distinction to position himself dialectically in relation to other philosophical views of freedom. He uses the idea that choice is the exercise of a mental power to ground a “noncausal” freedom: “Because an agent's exercising of a mental power is essentially intrinsically active, it is essentially uncaused or not produced” (8). So choices are free, where “free” entails being placed outside of the causal order. Because Goetz has acknowledged mental passivity as well, however, a great deal of human practical experience is seen as caused; hence he concedes a part of human practical experience to the determinist—only not the morally crucial part. Finally, by assigning causes and freedom to distinct aspects of human agency, Goetz is able to distinguish his position from compatibilism.