Abstract
Hegel indicates throughout his writings that the claims most pivotal to his system of philosophical science receive their proof only in logic itself. And yet, Hegel has surprisingly little to say in either the Encyclopaedia Logic or the Science of Logic itself about what he means by ‘proof’ or what sort of proof procedure it is that he thinks is suited to meet such a demand. In this paper, I develop an account of the proof procedure at work in the Logic by considering Hegel’s treatment of the traditional proofs of God’s existence (specifically, the ontological and the cosmological arguments) that he offers in the logical writings and in his Religionsphilosophie. I develop this account through the speculative reconstruction of the traditional arguments of natural theology that Hegel offers in his 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion and the 1829 Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God where, I argue, these arguments are divested of their syllogistic form and reformulated on the model of conceptual mediation. In the end, I explain how this account of the Logic’s proof procedure sheds light on two lingering interpretive issues in Hegel’s metaphysics: its relationship to the ontological argument and its solution to ‘the problem of beginning’.