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How many listings are too many? Agent inventory externalities and the residential housing market
Journal article   Peer reviewed

How many listings are too many? Agent inventory externalities and the residential housing market

Xun Bian, Bennie D. Waller, Geoffrey K. Turnbull and Scott A. Wentland
Journal of housing economics, Vol.28, pp.130-143
06-2015

Abstract

Asymmetric information House liquidity House prices Moral hazard Principal–agent problem Residential housing
•Real estate agents’ listing inventories adversely affect home prices and liquidity.•Theory suggests this is driven by dilution of agent effort and agency costs.•Results link greater agent inventory to significantly higher time on market.•The effect of greater agent inventory on selling price appears to be modest. Given the significant role of real estate agents in the housing market, this study examines how agents’ incentives regarding the size of their listing inventories indirectly affect residential home prices and liquidity. The theory shows that taking on additional inventory generates a critical principal–agent issue, resulting in the dilution of an agent’s selling effort and, ultimately, creating an externality that adversely impacts housing market outcomes across listings. It remains an empirical question whether diluted sales effort leads to lower prices, longer time on market, or both. The empirical results reveal significant inventory externality effects, as greater agent inventory tends to reduce selling price and substantially reduce liquidity for clients’ properties in this market.

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UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

This output has contributed to the advancement of the following goals:

#11 Sustainable Cities and Communities

Source: SDGs in the Output

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